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Radical Politics and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party by Daniel Pipes International Journal of Middle East Studies August 1988 http://www.danielpipes.org/5788/radical-politics-and-the-syrian-social-nationalist-party

In Syria the SSNP grew to a position of considerable influence in the years following the country's independence in 1946.

(((In 1949 episode, Syrian president Husni al-Za'im, offered Antun Sa'ada a warm welcome and promises of arms against the Lebanese authorities encouraging Sa'ada to take steps to overthrow the government. But Za'im betrayed Sa'ada in July 1949 and delivered him to the Lebanese police, who immediately had him executed. Za'im's treachery had wide consequences in Syria and Lebanon. In Syria, it contributed to Za'im's overthrow a month later, for many Syrians were offended by Za'im's breach of promise. The director-general of Za'im's police, Shishakli, provided important assistance to the coup and soon after took power himself. Za'im lost his life at the hands of a soldier avenging Sa'ada. In Lebanon, Riyad al-Sulh, one of the great figures of Lebanese politics and the premier at the time of Sa'ada's death, was assassinated by an SSNP member in July 1951. Za'im's actions engendered an ill will toward Damascus that harmed Lebanese-Syrian relations for years. In both countries, the SSNP benefited from a backlash of sympathy.)))

becoming a major political force immediately after the restoration of democracy in 1954. It was a fierce rival of the Syrian Communist Party and of the radical pan-Arab Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party, the other main ideological parties of the period.

((((From the late 1940s on, the Ba'th party was the SSNP's closest rival in Syria. It offered a similar set of attractions to roughly the same constituency. The history of these two parties is, to say the least, tangled. Perhaps the most striking thing is that, after engaging in a rivalry that culminated in open feuding during the late 1950s, they became steadfast allies twenty years later.

In their early years, the SSNP and the Ba'th Party shared a similar base of membership and means of recruitment. They competed for adherents primarily among the educated, radically minded non-Sunni minorities. This said, the Ba'th seems to have had a more urban and Sunni makeup, attracting eventually a fair number of Sunnis. Between them, they blanketed all the high schools of Syria,which were elite institutions at that time. Both parties advocated a program calling for secularism and state control of the economy. Secularism has a self-evident appeal for peoples long persecuted on account of their religious beliefs. State control of the economy (whether the SSNP's fascist version or the Ba'th's socialist one) held out the promise of economic opportunity. Both influenced military officers who had been party members as high school students; whereas the lower ranks mostly supported the SSNP, officers gravitated toward the Ba'th.

Initially, the SSNP had greater success than the Ba'th, for while both received 'Alawi backing, the SSNP also attracted Orthodox Christians. Both parties expanded in membership and influence in the early 1950s. The Ba'th caught up with the SSNP about this time and passed it a few years later. The disparity grew henceforth, with the Ba'th eventually become the ruling party in two states while the SSNP remained a small and widely despised movement.Ba'th leaders made some effort to attract Sunni Muslims; those of the SSNP did not. Joining the SSNP was always a more radical act than joining the Ba'th because the SSNP rejected tradition entirely in its quest for a new order. This contrast can be seen with regard to Pan-Arabism, Islam, and the role of religion in politics.

The SSNP's adamant rejection of Pan-Arabist nationalism very much diminished its appeal. Pan-Arabism feels congenial to Sunnis. Much of its draw lies in the compromise Pan-Arabism offers between the old aspiration to Islamic solidarity and the modern drive for nationhood.Fueled by Nasser's charisma, Pan-Arabism gained enormous popularity in the 1950s and the Ba'th gained accordingly. On the tactical level, the Ba'th showed cunning and flexibility, joining with or dropping others (al-Hawrani, Nasser) as suited the moment. In contrast, the SSNP formed few alliances, remained isolated among enemies, and suffered constant persecution. )))

In April 1955 Colonel Adnan al-Malki, a Ba'athist officer who was a very popular figure in the Syrian army, was assassinated by a party member. This provided the Communists and Ba'athists with the opportunity to eliminate their main ideological rival, and under pressure from them and their allies in the security forces the SSNP was practically wiped out as a political force in Syria.

(((Though long-standing ideological rivals, the SSNP and Ba'th became bitter enemies only after the Maliki affair. It seemed certain that the hostility between the SSNP and the Ba'th would go on indefinitely, or at least until the former was crushed. But their enmity did not continue; instead, the two parties underwent ideological and political transformations. In the process, the SSNP ended up an instrument of the Ba'th, while the Ba'th took on some of the ideology of the SSNP. This crossover led to the two becoming close if wary allies.

Spectacular failures suffered by both the Ba'th and SSNP in late 1961 sparked these changes. We have already seen how the SSNP's failed effort to overthrow the government of Lebanon in December led to its (public) repudiation of pure Pan-Syrianism and its refuge under the cover of Pan-Arabism. A generation later, that repudiation still stands.

The Ba'th experienced a more thorough transformation, changing inwardly as well as outwardly. In its case, it was the breakup of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in September 1961 that precipitated changes. The UAR debacle also strengthened the sense of being a Syrian and the attachment to this identity. After the UAR experiment, many Syrian citizens who previously had scorned their polity as meaningless came to appreciate it.

changes in government only confirmed the evolution away from Pan-Arabism. Bitar observed, with reason, that the 1966 coup "marked the end of Ba'thist politics in Syria." Michel 'Aflaq put the same sentiment more pungently: "I no longer recognize my party!" A former British ambassador to Syria and Lebanon, David Roberts, observes that "the Ba'th has parted company with the PPS and indeed banned it; but it has quietly absorbed its message." Asad agreed on many essential matters of foreign policy with the SSNP. He sought to bring all four countries that constitute Greater Syria under the rule of Damascus; indeed, as earlier ambitions toward Egypt and other distant regions withered, this became a central objective of Syrian foreign policy. According to Laurent and Annie Chabry, the Asad government "uses the foil of Pan-Arabism to pursue a Pan- Syrian policy of the sort once promoted by the SSNP.")))

The SSNP's stance during the Lebanese civil war and in Lebanese politics –where it has become a close ally of Hezbollah–[7] was consistent with that of Syria, and that facilitated a rapprochement between the party and the Syrian government. During Hafez al-Assad's presidency, the party was increasingly tolerated. ((((Mutual interests and growing ideological compatibility made the SSNP a client of the Syrian state and after decades of competition, the two sides became closely allied in Lebanon in 1976.Not all elements in the SSNP accepted Syrian patronage, and this led to a series of schisms that left the party split into several factions: Maoist, Rightist (led by George 'Abd al-Masih), and pro-Syrian. In'am Ra'd led the last faction for some years; under pressure from Damascus, he was succeeded in July 1984 by 'Isam al-Mahayiri, the party's first Syrian-born and Muslim leader. Israeli officials reportedly believed that Mahayiri took orders directly from Asad, and the Israeli Defense Minister, Yitzhaq Rabin, publicly characterized the SSNP as "entirely under the control of Syrian intelligence." )))

After the succession of his son Bashar in 2000, this process continued. In 2001, although still officially banned, the party was permitted to attend meetings of the Ba'ath-led National Progressive Front coalition of legal parties as an observer. In Spring 2005 the party was legalised in Syria, in what has been described as "an attempt to allow a limited form of political activity".[7] It is considered to be one of the largest political parties in the country, after the ruling Ba'ath Party, with perhaps 100,000 members.[27]

Over time, the SSNP and the Syrian Baathist regime experienced a dramatic turnabout in their historical relationship, from enemies to allies. (((Syrian help has transformed the party from a moribund relic to a dynamic force. )))The process started as the party reckoned that Hafez al-Assad regional goals such as consolidating Syria's control over Lebanon and the PLO were consistent with the SSNP's goal of establishing Greater Syria,[18] while the SSNP reciprocated acting as a Syrian proxy in Lebanon. (((If money and arms from Damascus allowed the SSNP to flourish temporarily, absorption by a police state rendered its future bleak. Alliance with Damascus contained the likely seeds of the SSNP's demise.

Perhaps aware of this, the anti-Syrian wing of the SSNP attempted to depose 'Isam al-Mahayiri as party leader in January 1987. In a coup marked by SSNP factions shooting at each other at the party headquarters, Jubran Juraysh replaced Mahayiri and threatened to try him before the SSNP Higher Council.)))

The alliance has strengthened on the face of the Syrian Civil War.

The SSNP never succeeded in attracting many followers outside Lebanon and Syria; in contrast, the Ba'th won sizeable support in Iraq, Jordan, and other countries, all of which added to its strength.

Its legacy of frustration does not invalidate the significance of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, which introduced a panoply of new ideas to the Middle East. These include the ideological party, complete political secularism, fascistic notions of leadership, and a dedication to pull down borders between states. The party drew in and influenced a generation of leaders in Lebanon and Syria. Its repeated challenges to the Lebanese state denigrated the prestige and status of the authorities. And its militia had a substantial role in the Lebanese civil war. Looking over a half century of turmoil, David Roberts notes that "the PPS has had a curiously pervasive influence through intrigue, murder and an ideology which rightly foresaw would be effective in the Levant."

But the long-term implications of alliance with Syria appeared ominous for the SSNP; Asad's support had a steep price. He sought to bring the party under Damascus's control and make it a shell for Syrian agents and an instrument of Syrian policy. The potential danger is clear; by agreeing to work so closely with Syria's rulers, the party forfeited the strength that had made it an important force over the decades-its visionary politics and fierce independence. Asad's success in dictating terms restricted the SSNP's capacity for autonomous action.