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Pharmaceutical lobby

The pharmaceutical lobby refers to the representatives of pharmaceutical drug and biomedicine companies who engage in lobbying in favour of pharmaceutical companies and their products.

Political influence in the United States

The largest pharmaceutical companies and their two trade groups, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) and Biotechnology Innovation Organization, lobbied on at least 1,600 pieces of legislation between 1998 and 2004. According to the non-partisan OpenSecrets, pharmaceutical companies spent $900 million on lobbying between 1998 and 2005, more than any other industry. During the same period, they donated $89.9 million to federal candidates and political parties, giving approximately three times as much to Republicans as to Democrats.[1] According to the Center for Public Integrity, from January 2005 through June 2006 alone, the pharmaceutical industry spent approximately $182 million on federal lobbying in the United States.[2] In 2005, the industry had 1,274 registered lobbyists in Washington, D.C.[3]

A 2020 study found that, from 1999 to 2018, the pharmaceutical industry and health product industry together spent $4.7 billion lobbying the United States federal government, an average of $233 million per year.[4]

Controversy in the U.S.

Prescription drug costs in the U.S.

Main article: Prescription drug prices in the United States

Critics of the pharmaceutical lobby argue that the drug industry's influence allows it to promote legislation friendly to drug manufacturers at the expense of patients.[5][failed verification] The lobby's influence in securing the passage of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 was considered a major and controversial[according to whom?] victory for the industry, as it prevents the government from directly negotiating prices with drug companies who provide those prescription drugs covered by Medicare. Price negotiations are instead conducted between manufacturers and the pharmacy benefit managers providing Medicare Part D benefits under contract with Medicare. In 2010 the Congressional Budget Office estimated the average discount negotiated by pharmacy benefit managers at 14%.[6]

The high price of U.S. prescription drugs has been a source of ongoing controversy. Pharmaceutical companies state that the high costs are the result of pricey research and development programs. Critics point to the development of drugs having only small incremental benefit.[5][7] According to Marcia Angell, former editor-in-chief of the New England Journal of Medicine, "The United States is the only advanced country that permits the pharmaceutical industry to charge exactly what the market will bear."[8] In contrast, the RAND Corporation and authors from the National Bureau of Economic Research have argued that price controls stifle innovation and are economically counterproductive in the long term.[9][10]

International operations

In 2021, during the height of COVID-19, vaccine makers increased lobbying and public-relations efforts to oppose a proposal that would temporarily waive their patents in Germany, Japan and other countries. This proposal would allow COVID-19 vaccine patents to be licensed to international vaccine makers or otherwise sold entirely. The Biden presidential administration in the U.S. supported the waiver proposal; however, pharmaceutical industry trade groups supported Germany, Japan, and other countries that expressed opposition. Pharmaceutical industry representatives have been lobbying members of Congress to pressure the Biden administration to reverse its support of the waiver, arguing that the patents protect its innovations. However, proponents of the proposal see the patent as giving companies a monopoly over sales of vaccines during a world crisis.[11]

See also

References

  1. ^ Smith, R. Jeffrey; Birnbaum, Jeffrey H. (12 January 2007). "Drug Bill Demonstrates Lobby's Pull". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 2 January 2017. Retrieved 19 February 2023.
  2. ^ "Pushing Prescriptions – The Center for Public Integrity". Archived from the original on Jul 3, 2007. Retrieved Aug 13, 2022.
  3. ^ Drinkard, Jim (16 April 2005). "Drugmakers go furthest to sway Congress". USA Today. Archived from the original on 28 June 2012. Retrieved 6 January 2021.
  4. ^ Wouters, Olivier J. (2020). "Lobbying Expenditures and Campaign Contributions by the Pharmaceutical and Health Product Industry in the United States, 1999-2018". JAMA Internal Medicine. 180 (5): 688–697. doi:10.1001/jamainternmed.2020.0146. PMC 7054854. PMID 32125357.
  5. ^ a b "Turn the Volume Down on Drug Ads". The New York Times. November 27, 2015. Archived from the original on June 26, 2018. Retrieved March 3, 2017.
  6. ^ Congressional Budget Office (September 2010). "Effects of Using Generic Drugs on Medicare's Prescription Drug Spending" (PDF). Congressional Budget Office. Archived (PDF) from the original on 12 November 2020. Retrieved 6 January 2021.
  7. ^ Malcolm Gladwell (25 October 2004). "High Prices". The New Yorker. Archived from the original on 5 May 2014. Retrieved 29 April 2016.
  8. ^ "Interviews - Marcia Angell - The Other Drug War - FRONTLINE - PBS". Archived from the original on 22 May 2016. Retrieved 29 April 2016.
  9. ^ Lakdawalla, Darius N.; Goldman, Dana P.; Michaud, Pierre-Carl; Sood, Neeraj; Lempert, Robert J.; Cong, Ze; de Vries, Han; Gutierrez, Italo A. (Jan 9, 2009). "U.S. Pharmaceutical Policy in a Global Marketplace". Archived from the original on August 13, 2022. Retrieved Aug 13, 2022 – via www.rand.org.
  10. ^ Santerre, Rexford E.; Vernon, John A. (2006). "Assessing Consumer Gains from a Drug Price Control Policy in the United States". Southern Economic Journal. 73 (1): 233–245. doi:10.2307/20111885. JSTOR 20111885.
  11. ^ The Wall Street Journal. "Covid-19 Vaccine Makers Press Countries to Oppose Patent Waiver". The Wall Street Journal. The Wall Street Journal. Archived from the original on 13 December 2022. Retrieved 13 December 2022.
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